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Abstract
Highly infectious diseases involve clinical syndromes ranging from single to multiorgan infections and pose a constant threat to
the public. In the absence of a deﬁnite treatment for most causative agents, patients beneﬁt from maximum supportive care as clinical
conditions may deteriorate in the short term. Hence, following initial case identiﬁcation and isolation, rapid transportation to a specia-
lized treatment unit must be considered in order to minimize the risk of secondary infections, but this is limited by available infrastruc-
ture, accessible care en route and the patient’s clinical condition. Despite the development of consensus curricula for the clinical
management of highly infectious patients, medical transportation lacks a common European approach. This article describes, as
examples, three current European concepts for the domestic relocation of highly infectious patients by ground vehicles and aircraft with
respect to national legislation and geography.
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Introduction
The European Network for Infectious Diseases (EUNID)
deﬁned highly infectious diseases (HIDs) as ‘transmissible
from person-to-person, causing life-threatening illness, and
presenting a serious hazard requiring speciﬁc control
measures’ [1]. With regard to the causative agent, clinical
presentation and time elapsed after onset of symptoms, a
patient’s condition may be stable over a period of days to
weeks (e.g. Mycobacterium tuberculosis infections) or deterio-
rate rapidly [e.g. viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF)] [2,3].
In the absence of a deﬁnite treatment for most HIDs, early
identiﬁcation of cases, immediate isolation and transfer to a
high-level isolation unit (HLIU) remain the reference standard,
following the aim of maximum supportive care and minimized
risk of secondary spread. Standard medical facilities can be
expected to be overwhelmed when facing imported or auto-
chthonous cases due to lack of trained personnel, infrastructure
and technical equipment [4]. Treatment concepts, including
supportive intensive care, are hardly applicable under such cir-
cumstances and raise the need for rapid relocation of patients
[1,5]. Despite European approaches to harmonize surveillance,
ﬁrst response and clinical management of HIDs, the domestic
transportation of cases lacks a common concept [1,6–9].
The beneﬁt of any medical transportation concept is lim-
ited by the availability of vehicles or aircraft, clinical status
and accessible care en route. Most such concepts derive
from the military sector and are deﬁned by the patient’s con-
dition (stable vs. unstable) and distance or mode of transport
(air vs. road). The term ‘medical evacuation’ (MEDEVAC)
refers to the short-distance transportation of patients prior
to deﬁnite treatment and is commonly conducted by ground
vehicles. ‘Aeromedical evacuation’ (AE) is deﬁned as long-dis-
tance transportation (>300 km) following initial treatment
allowing a successful relocation [10].
Compared with such concepts mainly focusing on trauma
care, relocating HID patients always follows an urgent, if not
contingency approach, as providing care in a safe environment
remains ﬁrst priority. Depending on access to HLIUs, national
legislation, geography and population density, different
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concepts for domestic relocation of HID patients have been
implemented. This article provides an overview of current
ground vehicle and ﬁxed-wing aircraft concepts that are imple-
mented and successfully used within three European countries.
Ground Vehicle Solutions for Highly
Infectious Patients in Germany
In Germany the Permanent Working Group of Competence
and Treatment Centres for HIDs was established to provide
a geographical coverage of HLIUs set up in eight cities, cov-
ering a maximum perimeter of 250–300 km each following
national law that prohibits air transport of HIDs [11]. Hence,
domestic transportation of HIDs is exclusively conducted on
modiﬁed or speciﬁcally designed ground ambulances. Staff on
board are members of the professional ﬁre brigades and
HLIU team members equipped with high-level personal pro-
tective equipment (hlPPE). Two solutions implemented by
the Frankfurt Centre of Competence will be described: (i)
the modiﬁcation of standard ambulances and (ii) a speciﬁcally
designed isolation vehicle.
1 Prior to 2007 the inside of a standard ambulance
stretcher-cabin (3.5–3.8 t, e.g. Mercedes Sprinter) was
sealed with plastic sheets connected by plaster to reduce
surface contamination and teams were drill-trained to
provide a fully equipped vehicle within 45–60 min after
notiﬁcation (Fig. 1). Teams on board consisted of one
driver, two paramedics and one physician, all trained in
the use of hlPPE and accompanying equipment. Transport
capacity was one stretcher, and communication between
driver and medical team was maintained by ﬁxed-fre-
quency radiotrafﬁc.
2 Since 2007 a combined intensive care and high-level isola-
tion transporter has replaced the above concept. Based
on a Daimler Chrysler AXOR 1823 chassis, a fully air-
conditioned container (3.52 t; Fig. 2) was designed.
Incoming and outgoing air is high-efﬁciency particulate
airﬁlter (HEPA)-ﬁltered and negative pressure ()15 Pa)
can be generated. The transport capacity is one
stretcher, one hospital bed or six seats (e.g. for clinically
stable contacts) and alerting time is 20 min. Teams on
board consist of two (paramedic and driver) as well as
one physician, and communication between personnel
caring for the ill and the driver’s cabin is maintained by
ﬁxed-frequency intercom. Depending on access to exter-
nal power supply, the container allows an unlimited
stand-by as well as stand-alone function. Hence, this con-
cept offers a surge capacity solution in case of technical
problems within the corresponding HLIU (Fig. 3).
Due to physical stress and technical limitation of respirators,
working shifts are reduced to 4 h and both vehicles must be
accompanied by additional personnel in case of physical
breakdown or a necessary change of shifts. Technical equip-
ment, PPE and other medical material has to be carried in
additional vehicles and the convoy must be escorted by state
police. Final internal fumigation and surface decontamination
is conducted at a specialized ﬁre watch dedicated to the cor-
responding HLIU. Depending on the causative agent, disinfec-
tants approved by the Robert-Koch-Institute (Berlin,
Germany) are used. In case of standard ambulances, plastic
sheets are withdrawn beforehand and all medical equipment
decontaminated. In contrast, the AXOR container allows
storage of equipment in aerosol-sealed boxes. Hence, mate-
rial in boxes not opened en route can be re-used without
further need for disinfection.
FIG. 1. The interior of a standard road ambulance sealed with plas-
tic to avoid surface contamination (courtesy of Berufsfeuerwehr
Frankfurt).
FIG. 2. The HEPA-ﬁltered AXOR 1382 container vehicle (courtesy
of Berufsfeuerwehr Frankfurt).
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Combined Ground and Air Transport of
Highly Infectious Patients in Sweden:
Containment within Road Ambulance in
Military Aircrafts
In Sweden, two HLIUs are located in the south-east of the
country (Linko¨ping) and a primary risk assessment concept
has been implemented in other parts of the country. Hence,
relocation of HID patients demands both short- and long-dis-
tance concepts up to 1000 km by ground ambulances and
aeromedical support.
1 For short-distance road transport, two HEPA-ﬁltered
modiﬁed ground ambulances are collocated with the
HLIU in Linko¨ping. These vehicles are used for transport
up to 4 h driving distance according to the limitations of
continuous work in hlPPE.
2 For long-distance transport, a collaborative AE project
supported by the Swedish National Board of Health and
Welfare was implemented in 1997. The aim of the pro-
ject was to provide safe and efﬁcient domestic long-dis-
tance relocation of HID patients to the HLIUs. To avoid
mobile isolators, ﬁxed-wing aircraft transportation of
patients within a sealed off ground vehicle was the pre-
ferred option [11,12]. This combined MEDEVAC–AE
concept allows a modiﬁed standard ambulance (Mercedes
Sprinter 416 CDI, total weight 4350 kg) to be fully
operating onboard a military TP84/C130 Hercules during
ﬂight (Figs 4 and 5), thus reducing critical moments of
loading/unloading and providing both secure containment
as well as supportive intensive care en route.
For ﬂight-security reasons any equipment onboard the
ambulance requires approval by the responsible authorities.
The Swedish Defence Material Administration supervises all
material regulations, tests as well as ﬁnal certiﬁcation. In
order to avoid redundancy of equipment, all material must
be applicable to both the ambulance and aircraft require-
ments. To withstand g-forces created during certain ﬂight
FIG. 3. The container operating as a stand-alone deployable high-
level isolation unit (courtesy of Berufsfeuerwehr Frankfurt).
FIG. 4. Boarding of a HEPA-ﬁltered ground ambulance onto a Her-
cules C 130 in Linko¨ping, Sweden.
FIG. 5. Set-up of the portable anteroom attached to the rear end of
an ambulance prior to takeoff.
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manoeuvres, all equipment is ﬁxed onto reinforced holders
and the patient remains bed-bound. In case of sudden
decompression, all personnel carry oxygen masks within
their hlPPE, connectable to a reserve oxygen supply. The
ambulance’s energy supply is provided by the aircraft’s
ordinary electrical system. To prevent air-borne contamina-
tion of the aircraft the ambulance container is sealed, kept
under negative pressure (10–20 Pa) and outgoing air is
HEPA-ﬁltered.
The Swedish air transport team (excluding the ﬂight crew)
consists of six to eight members, including two to four regis-
tered nurses and two physicians, one anaesthesiologist
accompanying the patient, and one infectious disease specia-
list outside the HID container. Two paramedics responsible
for loading and unloading procedures maintain continuous
radio contact with staff inside the container and provide
external equipment support. AE team members regularly
conduct training in cooperation with the Swedish extracor-
poreal membrane oxygenation team in emergency trans-
ports. In case of ﬂights exceeding 4 h, donning and dofﬁng of
hlPPEs is conducted inside a portable anteroom, providing
both safe entrance and exit to and from the ambulance. A
modiﬁed chemical decontamination tent (Fig. 6) with air-
inﬂated pylons ensuring an upright position is attached to the
ambulance, and is continuously ventilated with outgoing air
HEPA-ﬁltered. For decontamination of staff, peracetic acid is
used as ﬂammable disinfectants must be avoided [13,14]. For-
maldehyde fumigation is performed for ﬁnal decontamination
when the mission is completed.
Combined Ground and Air Transport of
Highly Infectious Patients in Italy: Modiﬁed
Road Ambulances and Military Aircrafts
In Italy, two referral centres for HIDs in Rome [National
Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI) ‘L. Spallanzani’] and
Milan (Hospital ‘L. Sacco’) provide care for suspected or
conﬁrmed HID patients if transport is feasible [15].
1 For short-distance transport (<3 h), speciﬁcally designed
road ambulances and stretcher transport isolators (STI;
Fig. 7) are collocated at the referral centres. Teams are
equipped with standard or hlPPE, depending on the clini-
cal risk assessment and the use of STIs. STIs generate
negative pressure and outgoing air is HEPA ﬁltered. The
ambulances also provide negative pressure, HEPA ﬁltra-
tion of outgoing air, an emergency power generator and
external shower are divided into three separate, aerosol-
sealed compartments: the driver’s cabin, technical, and
sanitary compartment. Being separated by glass from the
sanitary one, the technical compartment functions as a
storage for PPEs and medical devices. In the sanitary
compartment supportive intensive care can be applied.
The ambulance team at INMI consists of two drivers,
two physicians and seven nurses. Ambulances are fully
equipped in 30 min and decontamination procedures
include surfaces but not fumigation.
2 For long-distance transport an AE concept is available. In
2005 the National Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control set up an interministerial project to establish
guidelines for the cross-border repatriation of VHF cases,
which were adopted to the domestic relocation of all HIDs
thereafter. The Italian Air Force provides a rapid-response
team [Aeromedical Isolation Team (AIT)] located on Pra-
tica di Mare Air Force Base for both international and
domestic AE in order to relocate HID cases and provide
medical care under high-level containment. The AIT con-
sists of two teams, each comprised of three physicians
(one team leader and two specialists in infectious diseases
and anaesthesiology) and six infectious diseases nurses.
Patients are transported in an aircraft transit isolator (ATI,
Fig. 8), a self-contained plastic isolation facility provided with
FIG. 6. Change of shift after decontamination aboard a Hercules C
130 via a portable anteroom.
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negative pressure and HEPA ﬁltration of outgoing air. Cur-
rently, two ATIs for AE and one STI for ground vehicle
transportation are in use. The ATIs are connectable to the
STIs used by INMI, thus reducing contamination risks during
the passage of patients from ATIs to STIs (Fig. 9). Military
components of the AIT are trained every 15 days at Pratica
di Mare Air Force Base in close relationship with homolo-
gous units of civilian organization such as INMI. In addition,
international training activity in collaboration with the US
Army AIT is conducted.
Discussion
HIDs pose a constant threat to the European Community
and have been a challenge for public health systems within
recent years [16,17]. Domestic relocation of HIDs is driven
by infection control implications and the need to provide
access to medical care not available on site. The concepts
depicted in this article provide feasible solutions with regard
to individual circumstances in different countries. A broad
range of technical, legislative and medical problems needs to
be addressed and solved upon determining the most appro-
priate solutions for patient transport [18]. According to the
EUNID consensus, expert clinical risk assessment is essential
to deﬁne both the need for and the mode of transport [1].
Clinical conditions
A patient’s clinical condition is the major limitation of any
medical transport procedures. Alert and continent HID
patients suffering from single-organ infections may be iso-
lated and monitored in the place of identiﬁcation prior to
relocation until a tentative diagnosis is laboratory proven
or excluded. Thus, a clear decision on the level of PPE and
the need for treatment in a HLIU can be achieved. In con-
trast, in the early stages of VHFs or sepsis, patients may be
alert, cooperative and continent but deteriorate in the
short term. Urgent relocation under validated infection
control procedures is indicated, as spillage of body ﬂuids or
aerosol-provoking procedures may occur en route [19–21].
For unstable patients, a contingency transportation must be
considered or none at all, as severe hypovolaemia, bleeding,
pulmonary and cardiovascular dysfunction may contraindi-
cate transportation [3,12]. Supportive care on site may be
necessary, although the infrastructure and infection control
regimen may be insufﬁcient [22,23]. The latter can occur in
the late course of VHFs when short-term stabilization of
patients may not be fruitful. Hence, procedures for the
relocation of personnel and equipment should be included
in any domestic transportation concept. Reduced or absent
access to HLIU in some European member states and
international guidelines prohibiting the relocation of HIDs
FIG. 8. An aircraft transit isolator used by the Italian Air Force for
Aeromedical transportation aboard a Hercules C 130 aircraft.
FIG. 7. A stretcher transport isolator used by the National Institute
for Infectious Diseases (Rome, Italy) for ground vehicle transporta-
tion and passage from aircraft to ground vehicles.
FIG. 9. Passage of a patient from the aircraft transit isolator to
the stretcher transport isolator by the Italian Air Force Aeromedical
Isolation Team and Institute for Infectious Diseases unit.
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further underline the need for (inter-)nationally deployable
teams [3,24,25].
Mode of transport
The appropriate mode of transport is deﬁned and limited by
the vehicles available and the distance to the next HLIU [1].
Using either isolation beds or hlPPE depends on the mode of
transportation, the corresponding HLIU, and national legisla-
tion. Avoiding isolation beds demands a higher physical bur-
den and surge capacity of PPEs but allows the most direct
access to the patient en route [11,12]. For ground vehicles,
both concepts are applicable, but must be adapted to sec-
ond-line AE, if available. In general, short-distance relocations
up to 4 h should be covered by ground vehicles according to
long-term experience of their role in pre-hospital care, disin-
fection, and the equipment and team on board [26–28].
Moreover, the ambulance crew are able to wear ‘full stan-
dard’ or hlPPE. Ambulances equipped with a standard set of
medical devices are easily accessible but may require techni-
cal modiﬁcations in some European countries [1,26,29]. A
risk management programme must allow en route manage-
ment of accidents and major spillages by the team and
guards. Known disadvantages include reduced geographical
range, reduced space and time needed to relocate patients,
but the complications caused by the rigors of transport are
minimized [30]. In addition, air-conditioned and HEPA-ﬁl-
tered ground vehicles allow transport over greater distances
under reduced physical stress for the personnel. The time
needed until operating is minimized as no additional infection
control barriers have to be applied and containers may addi-
tionally function as surge capacity or deployable HLIUs.
AE is the most applicable solution for long-distance trans-
port. AE is regarded as a fast, reliable and secure mode of
transport under ordinary circumstances, although the rigors
of transport are severe. The physiological effects of altitude
(e.g. hypoxia, hypobaric depression and turbulence) may
have a negative inﬂuence on a patient’s condition. Common
complications of HIDs, such as haemodynamic instability,
severe anaemia or lung disease may contraindicate AE.
Hence, clinical pre-ﬂight evaluation of patients remains an
essential precondition of AE and should follow standardized
evaluation criteria [31]. Medical equipment on board must
be speciﬁcally approved for AE. Moreover, loading and
unloading of patients are time consuming procedures and
involve potentially hazardous moments for both the patient
and the environment. Furthermore, speciﬁc training of per-
sonnel is necessary when seeking high-level care under mini-
mized risk en route. However, providing care en route,
using a transport isolator, has been a feasible solution in
Taiwan [32,33]. In addition to the Swedish and Italian
concept depicted, US and British Air Force teams have long-
term experience in both national and international AE trans-
port of HIDs.
Great progress has been made in recent years in response
to the political will to harmonize Europe’s ﬁrst response and
clinical management of HID cases. The broad range of spe-
cialists, research and manpower involved in deﬁning generally
feasible guidelines for the domestic and international reloca-
tion of patients calls for a common approach in the near
future.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all co-workers of their
national networks who have contributed to the conception
and implementation of the transport systems depicted. The
institutions involved were:
Germany: Berufsfeuerwehr and Stadtgesundheitsamt
Frankfurt am Main; Sozialministerium Hessen, Wiesbaden.
Sweden: National Board of Health and Welfare; Swedish
Institute for Infectious Disease Control; County Council of
O¨stergo¨tland; Swedish Air Force.
United Kingdom: Infectious Diseases Department; Royal
Free Hospital, Hampstead, London; London Ambulance Ser-
vice NHS Trust; Royal Air Force.
Italy: Italian Air Force Health Department, Rome, and
Aeromedical Isolation Team; Ministero della Salute, Ricerca
Corrente, IRCCS; Ministero della Salute, Direzione Generale
della Prevenzione Sanitaria- ufﬁcio III coordinamento USMAF,
Ufﬁcio V Malattie Infettive e Proﬁlassi Internazionale; Presi-
denza del Consiglio dei Ministri: Dipartimento della Prote-
zione Civile e Ufﬁcio Voli di Stato; Ministero dell’Interno
Dipartimento dei vigili del fuoco, del soccorso pubblico e
della difesa civile.
Transparency Declaration
None of the authors have professional, personal or ﬁnancial
conﬂicts of interest that would inﬂuence the conduct or
reporting of this study.
References
1. Bannister B, Puro V, Fusco FM, Heptonstall J, Ippolito G and the
EUNID Writing Committee. Framework for the design and opera-
tional management of high-level isolation units in Europe: consensus
of the European Network for Infectious Diseases. Lancet Infect Dis
2009; 9: 45–56
732 Clinical Microbiology and Infection, Volume 15 Number 8, August 2009 CMI
ª2009 The Authors
Journal Compilation ª2009 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 15, 727–733
2. Chan ED, Iseman MD. Multidrug-resistant and extensively drug-resis-
tant tuberculosis: a review. Curr Opin Infect Dis 2008; 21: 587–595.
Review.
3. Geisbert TW, Jahrling PB. Exotic emerging viral diseases: progress
and challenges. Nat Med 2004; 10 (Suppl 12): S110–S121.
4. Bennett RL. Chemical or Biological Terrorist Attacks: an analysis of
the preparedness of hospitals for managing victims affected by chemi-
cal or biological weapons of mass destruction. Int J Environ Res Public
Health 2006; 3: 67–75.
5. Siegel JD, Rhinehart E, Jackson M, Chiarello L, and the Healthcare
Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee. Guideline for isola-
tion precautions: preventing transmission of infectious agents in
healthcare settings. Am J Infect Control 2007; 35 (suppl): 65S–164S.
6. Weinberg J, Nohynek H, Giesecke J. Development of a European
electronic network on communicable diseases: the IDA-HSSCD pro-
gramme. Euro Surveill 1997; 2: pii 165.
7. Crowcroft N, Morgan D, Brown DW. Viral haemorrhagic fevers in
Europe—effective control requires a co-ordinated response. Euro Sur-
veill 2002; 7: pii 343.
8. Niedrig M, Donoso-Mantke O, Scha¨dler R and ENIVD members. The
European Network for Diagnostics of Imported Viral Diseases
(ENIVD): 12 years of strengthening the laboratory diagnostic capacity
in Europe. Euro Surveill 2007; 12: E070419.5. Review.
9. Baka A, Fusco FM, Puro V et al. and European Network of Infectious
Diseases. A curriculum for training healthcare workers in the manage-
ment of highly infectious diseases. Euro Surveill 2007; 12: E5–E6. Review.
10. Hurd WW, Jernigan JG, eds. Aeromedical evacuation: management of
acute and stabilized patient. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2003.
11. Wirtz A, Niedrig M, Fock R. Management of patients with suspected
viral hemorrhagic fever or other potential lethal contagious infections
in Germany. Euro Surveill 2003; 7: 36–42.
12. Christopher GW, Eitzen EM Jr. Air evacuation under high-level bio-
safety containment: the aeromedical isolation team. Emerg Infect Dis
1999; 5: 241–246.
13. Bailey J. Guide to hygiene and sanitation in aviation. Geneva: World
Health Organization, 1977. ISBN 9241541237.
14. Withers MR, Christopher GW. Aeromedical evacuation of biological
warfare casualties: a treatise on infectious diseases on aircraft. Mil
Med 2000; 165 (Suppl 3): 1–21.
15. Ministry of Health, Italy. Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers, guidelines for the
transport. Available at: http://www.ministerosalute.it/imgs/C_17_
pubblicazioni_548_allegato.pdf (Italian).
16. World Health Organization (WHO). Case of Marburg Haemorrhagic
Fever imported into the Netherlands from Uganda. Epidemic and Pandemic
Alert and Response (EPR). Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organi-
zation (WHO), 10 July 2008.
17. Health Protection Agency. A single case of inhalation anthrax in a drum
maker in London. London: Health Protection Agency, Health Protec-
tion Report 2008, 2 (31).
18. Withers MR, Christopher GW, Hatﬁll SJ, Guiterrez-Nunez JJ. Aero-
medical evacuation of patients with contagious infections. In: Hurd
WW, Jernigan JG, eds, Aeromedical evacuation: management of acute
and stabilized patient. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2003; 147–159.
19. Aleksandrowicz P, Wolf K, Falzarano D, Feldmann H, Seebach J,
Schnittler H. Viral haemorrhagic fevers and vascular alterations.
Hamostaseologie 2008; 28: 77–84. Review.
20. Dellinger RP, Levy MM, Carlet JM et al. for the International Surviving
Sepsis Campaign Guidelines Committee. Surviving sepsis campaign:
international guidelines for management of severe sepsis and septic
shock: 2008. Crit Care Med 2008; 36: 296–327.
21. Fisher-Hoch SP, Price ME, Craven RB et al. Safe intensive-care man-
agement of a severe case of Lassa fever with simple barrier nursing
techniques. Lancet 1985; 2: 1227–1229.
22. Teichman PG, Donchin Y, Kot RJ. International aeromedical evacua-
tion. N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 262–270.
23. Kashania KB, Farmer JC. The support of severe respiratory failure
beyond the hospital and during transportation. Curr Opin Crit Care
2006; 12: 43–49.
24. World Health Organization. Transport of infectious substances. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Health Organization, Department for Communic-
able Disease Surveillance and Response, 2004.
25. World Health Organization. International health regulations. Geneva,
Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2005.
26. Johannigman JA. Maintaining the continuum of en route care. Crit Care
Med 2008; 36: S377–S382.
27. Andersena BM, Rascha M, Hochlina K, Jensenb F-H, Wismarc P, Fre-
driksend J-E. Decontamination of rooms, medical equipment and
ambulances using an aerosol of hydrogen peroxide disinfectant. J
Hosp Infect 2006; 62: 149–155.
28. Einav S, Feigenberg Z, Weissman C. Priorities evacuation in terror-
related mass casualty events: implications for planning contingency.
Ann Surg 2004; 239: 304–310.
29. Macnab AJ, Grant G, Stevens K, Gagnon F, Noble R, Sun C. Cost :
beneﬁt of point-of-care blood gas analysis vs. laboratory measure-
ment during stabilization prior to transport. Prehosp Disast Med 2003;
18: 24–28.
30. Polk JD, Fallon WF Jr. Indications and considerations for emergent
evacuation of the peacetime casualty. In: Hurd WW, Jernigan JG, eds,
Aeromedical evacuation: management of acute and stabilized patient.
New York: Springer-Verlag, 2003; 13–26.
31. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) STANAG 3204. Aerome-
dical Evacuation. July 15, 1999.
32. Tsai SH, Tsang CM, Wu Hr et al. Transporting patient with suspected
SARS. Emerg Infect Dis 2004; 10: 1325–1326.
33. Beninati W, Meyer MT, Carter TE. The critical care air transport
program. Crit Care Med 2008; 36: 370–376.
CMI Schilling et al. HID transport 733
ª2009 The Authors
Journal Compilation ª2009 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 15, 727–733
